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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR: SECTION 202(a)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1964
A. A_,Rwaws: Mr. Brooks, do you think in this poverty bill there is a danger
of setting up what we call "political bossism" in the cities?
A1. BRoors: I don't believe it is possible in the city of Chicago because this
isn't the way we approach the problem . .. I am saying, sir, that the poverty
program is being operated under the concept that no politics may be good politics
in this area.
Statement of Deton J. Brooks, Jr., Executive Director Chicago Committee on Urban
Opportunity, Hearings Before The Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st es., at 385
(1965).
When Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act in August,
1964, a Community Action Program was defined as, among other things,
a program "which is developed, conducted and administered with the
maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members
of the groups served."1 Without this provision the war on urban poverty
might simply have been a technical assistance program for city welfare
administrators, providing them with an incentive to introduce progres-
sive social work methods. But section 202(a)(3), paraphrased as "maxi-
mum participation of the poor," has been commonly interpreted as a
mandate for federal assistance in the effort to create political organiza-
tions of the poor. The dispute between proponents of this interpretation
and mayors who are uneasy about class political consciousness in the
slums has in turn involved the federal government in an historically
important controversy about the political role of the urban poor.
This conflict has focused on three interpretations of section 202(a)(3)
which have been advanced as definitions of the poverty agency's statu-
tory obligation to the poor.
1. Involving the Poor. This approach limits the objectives of section
202(a)(3) to participation of the poor in social service activities. A local
* We wish to thank the Walter E. Meyer Foundation for its generous support of the
travel and research necessary for this Comment.
1. 78 Stat. 516 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2782(a)(3) (1964).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
community action program discharges its responsibilities if the poor
share in the administration of neighborhood day-care and employment
centers and thus regard these services without the antagonism the poor
are supposed to feel for distant welfare bureaucracies. On the city-wide
level, poor people are expected to participate in the planning activities
of the community action board. There is no obligation to make local
poverty programs an instrument for broader participation by the poor
in city politics.
2. Section 202(a)(3) Literalism. A literal interpretation of the sec-
tion rejects the common paraphrase, participation of the poor, and
takes at face value the statutory reference to "maximum feasible par-
ticipation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served."
This approach rationalizes a preference for appointing, as neighborhood
representatives to the community action boards, "the steady and stable
steel worker, postal clerk or fireman who is active in the affairs of the
old neighborhood where he lives."2 The "steady and stable steel
worker" may be a Caucasian remnant in a poor Negro neighborhood,
but the literalists claim that neighborhood solidarity makes the steel-
worker a better "link" between the poor and the poverty program than
a professional social worker. 3
3. Political Organizations of the Poor. A political interpretation of
section 202(a)(3) demands more than humane social service centers
responsive to the needs and expressed preferences of the poor. The
political approach presents the poverty program as an opportunity "to
revive the instruments of representative governments which lie in
wreck and ruin in the fast-growing Negro slums" 4 and presumes that
the only genuinely representative politics feasible in the contemporary
slum is class politics. Advocates of this interpretation expect OEO to
underwrite militant slum organizations whose protest activities promise
to change the traditional pattern of political withdrawal among the
urban poor. Through rent strikes, demonstrations against non-enforce-
ment of housing codes or the sale of rotten meat, and registration
drives aimed at unfriendly politicians, slum organizations would make
the political system respond to the interests of the poor as machine
politics does not.
The demands for a political version of participation of the poor arise
from skepticism about the pluralist image of an open and responsive
2. Pamphlet of the United States Conference of Mayors, quoted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1966, p. 43, col. 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Quoted in Ramparts, Feb. 1966, p. 40.
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American political system.5 Beneath the piolonged economic discrimi-
nation and educational failures, which are commonly acknowledged as
the causes of poverty, the supporters of poor people's political organiza-
tions see a breakdown of the democratic process. They accept the
pluralist ideal of "a political system in which all the active and legiti-
mate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some
stage in the process of decision." But they doubt whether the interests
of the poor are served by any of the existing "active and legitimate
groups." The poor, they observe, lack all the important characteristics
of a successful interest group-command of substantial economic and
social resources, extensive interaction among members, a supply of ex-
perienced leaders, and deep commitment to a clear and conservative set
of objectives.7 Some of these handicaps are common to any disadvan-
taged group setting out to play politics. But others-most notably, inter-
action among members and commitment to common goals-were
important resources of the labor movement that are missing among the
contemporary poor.8 The numerical strength of the poor is precisely
the resource that is foreshortened when interest-group bargaining re-
places voting as the focus of political analysis.
These special disadvantages provide the case for government as-
sistance to slum neighborhood organizations with frankly political ob-
jectives. Without help from the federal government, it is argued, the
poor will continue to be left out of the bargaining process; and in a
system that rewards effective group politics, this exclusion is equivalent
to denying the poor their right to full political participation. There was
an obvious base of support for organizing the slums inside the civil
rights movement. The political interpretation acquired an additional
5. Pluralism presents domestic politics as a successful process of conflict resolution among
interest groups representing all the divergent attitudes within American society. An equi-
librium mechanism prevents any single group or cluster of groups from dominating the
others. The diversity and accessibility of these groups and the susceptibility of their lead-
ers to internal control assures virtually everyone of representation in the bargaining pro-
cess. See generally DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); TRusrn, TIE Gov-
ERNENTAL PROCESS (1962). For a typical act of worship at the altar of pluralism, see gen-
erally IxRNER, A NmacA AS A CLIZATION (1957). Cf. generally Hu.aprmEv, WAR o. Pov-
aTrY (1964); Hura, THm SLurs (1964); MAY, THE VAsTED AtERiCANs: Cosrs oF OttR
WVELrARE DII..mA (1964); BAGDIEIAN, IN THE Mms-r or PLEN-rY: TiE Poor L'N A.su.4a,
(1964).
6. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCATIC THEORY 137 (1956); Cf., LA.cER & MicHELt.. LIFE
STRESS AND M.ENTAL HEALTH (1963); RImsMAN, COHEN, & PEARL, MENrAL HEALTH or Tr1E
POOR: NEW TREATMIENT APPROACHES FOR LOW INCOME PEOPLE (1964).
7. TRU mAN, THE GOvERNMENTAL PROCESS 506-07 (1962).
8. For the role of these factors in the unions' initial organizing period. see generally
Ln'snr, TRow, & COLENIAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956).
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constituency among social work theoreticians whose dissatisfaction with
bureaucratic welfare methods led them to seek a remedy for the debili-
tating psychology of poverty in militant poor people's organizations.
Under their combined influence the political perspective on section
202(a)(3) has become the dominant of the three interpretations in public
discussion of the War on Poverty.
STATUTORY HISTORY
The future importance of the provision for participation of the poor
was not apparent to most of the task force from the Executive Office of
the President and the interested congressmen who, between them,
wrote the Community Action Title of the Economic Opportunity Act.
The authors were mildly receptive to the idea, which originated in the
President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, that the poor would
benefit from involvement in the formulation and administration of
welfare programs.10 But the draftsmen's primary concern was to pro-
vide a federal incentive for cooperation among the local social service
agencies,"1 and the provision for participation might not have been
included if the sponsors had recognized its potential for interfering
with OEO's patronage of local welfare coalitions. Certainly, there is no
evidence of thoughtful commitment to participation of the poor by
either Congress or the majority of the drafting group. Section 202(a)
was thrust into the Act without any attempt to accomodate the rest of
the poverty program to this revolutionary concept of participation.
The bulk of the Community Action Title, with its emphasis on social
service cooperation, was a response to the growth of autonomous city
welfare bureaucracies which seemed never to see farther than the
limits of their respective social service functions. The authors of the
bill hoped to curb the trend toward separatism by creating city-wide
9. The Community Action Title is Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964;
Title I provides for the Job Corps and other youth programs; Title III covers special
rural programs; Title IV provides small business incentives; Title V authorizes payments
for experimental job training programs for adults; Title VI governs the administration
and coordination of the Act; Title VII governs the effect of anti-poverty payments on a
person's rights under the Social Security Act.
10. Among the authors of the bill in the Executive Office of the President were a few
staff members of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency who were partlcu-
larly interested in participation of the poor. They included David L. Hackett, the director
of the Committee, and Stanford L. Kravitz, then Program Coordinator for the Juvenile
Delinquency Committee and now at OEO as Chief of Research and Program Development,
Community Action Program.
11. Interviews with Frederick O'R. Hayes, a participant in the drafting meetings and
now Director, Field Operations Division, Community Action Program, in Washington, D.C.,
July and Sept. 1965.
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"umbrella agencies" that would impose cooperation and encourage
experimentation among conservative social service functionaries." The
community action ideal was a city which, with the prodding of federal
funds, unifies its welfare programs and "enters into a binding agree-
ment to pull itself up by its own bootstraps."'13
"Comprehensive planning" and "inter-agency cooperation," have re-
cently become mistrusted terms which often serve as euphemisms for
excluding the poor from planning and administering the poverty pro-
gram.' 4 But the umbrella doctrine's vision of cooperation was generally
accepted in 1964, and understandably dominated the meetings that
produced the Economic Opportunity Act. Since community action's
only serious political problem seemed to be the jealous independence
of welfare officials, the draftsmen were particularly interested in the
Ford Foundation Community Action projects, most notably Com-
munity Progress Incorporated (CPI) in New Haven. 15 The draftsmen
were convinced by CPI's success that a skillful local coordinator, with
substantial outside funds and a strong mayor at his disposal, could elicit
inter-agency cooperation against poverty and quicken the pace of in-
novation in the social services.' 6 The key drafters hoped that poverty
12. Telephone interview with Hal Horowitz, a participant in the meetings, in Los
Angeles, Sept. 28, 1965.
13. Sargent Shriver, quoted by James Ridgeway in Poor Chicago, The New Republic,
May 15, 1965, p. 17.
14. In his appearance before the House Committee on Education and Labor, Dr. Deton
J. Brooks, Jr., director of the Chicago community action program, was subjected to a
painful cross-examination about the role of the poor in the Chicago program. But before
the questioning began, he delivered a rhapsody on the cooperation of public and private
welfare agencies through the Chicago community action board. Brooks described the
board as a comprehensive collection of:
leaders from education, politics, community service, public service, housing, labor,
business, religion and civil rights.... Understanding the structure of this committee
is the key to understanding Chicago's ability to mobilize an entire community in the
War on Poverty. The committee stands on firm bedrock of a highly interrelated
citywide agency and institutional structure.
Neighborhood representatives, he noted, would eventually be added "as they become
active in the community action program of the city." Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on the War on Poverty of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 523 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
15. Telephone interview with Hal Horowitz, in Los Angeles, Sept. 28, 1965. Inter-
view with Christopher Weeks, Deputy Director of the Job Corps, in Washington, D.C.,
June 10, 1965.
16. CPI has been described as an exercise in the use of "cajolery, persuasion, coercion,
and... foundation money bribery, to construct an alliance of service-providing organi-
zations in which CPI, if not autocratic commander, would at least be primus inter pares,
and the effective architect of the service machinery of the city." Carter, Structuring a
Community Action Project, June 1965 (unpublished paper on file in the Yale Law Library).
For a jaundiced view of C.P.L, cf. Calm & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Per-
spective, 73 YA.x L.J. 1317 (1964).
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program funds could serve the same purpose in other cities that Ford
money had served in New Haven. Therefore, they agreed that to qualify
for anti-poverty funds agencies would have to satisfy two requirements:
1) The local organization must represent an alliance among all the
elements in the city with an interest in the War on Poverty.
2) This umbrella agency must take advantage of its broad basis to
prepare a comprehensive anti-poverty program."
The version of the Economic Opportunity Act that emerged from
the drafting group specified the social service agencies that were to
participate with the local school system in a community action pro-
gram. This draft would have withheld funds from a city until they
were all included in the program. To obtain comprehensiveness, the
authors of the bill were prepared to wait three to five years if necessary
for community action in some cities.18 But Sargent Shriver and some
of his associates were unwilling to sacrifice immediate action, and in
addition, a few members of Congress regarded a rigid Community Ac-
tion Title as a threat to the independence of local school systems.10 In-
stead of providing a membership requirement for local community
action programs, the final version of the Act promotes social service
cooperation indirectly in section 211 by giving a funding "preference
to programs and projects which are components of a comprehensive
community action program." 20 And section 612 directs other federal
agencies to favor participants in a local community action program.
Through its administration of the Community Action Title, OEO
has obtained easily the inclusive institutional alliances which were not
made a strict requirement of the Act. The Community Action Guide
contains a list of the agencies ministering to the poor (covering educa-
tion, housing, and the traditional welfare functions) that OEO expects
to be represented in every umbrella program. 21 Most cities have readily
acquiesced in these instructions. The problem of the independent
school system has turned out to be a phantom issue which has never
caused OEO serious trouble.2 2 Community action administrators like
17. Interview with Miss Ann Oppenheimer, a participant in the drafting meetings, in
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1965.
18. Ibid.
19. Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon, who opposed rigid community action
agencies, believed that officious social service bureaucrats interfered excessively with the
administration of Benjamin Cardozo High School in Washington, D.C.; and she feared
that a rigid Community Action Title would make Cardozo's troubles a national problem.
20. 78 Stat. 520 (1964), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2791 (1964).
21. OEO, Community Action Program Guide, Instructions for Applicants, at 17-18
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Program Guide].
22. Interviews with Frederick O'R. Hayes, Director, Field Operations Division, Com.
munity Action Program, in Washington, D.C., July and Sept. 1965.
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Ben Zimmerman in Syracuse have brought the New Haven style of
institutional cooperation and innovation to strongholds of separatism.2
THE CONFLICT IN STATUTORY GoALs
When the Community Action Title was being written, the goal of
involving the poor seemed compatible with the ideal of social service
cooperation. The Juvenile Delinquency Program's neighborhood or-
ganizations were living amicably with the welfare agencies and the city
politicians. But this false calm occurred during a latency period in the
development of independent poor people's organizations which, in
maturity, have been more politically assertive than seemed possible in
the winter of 1964. Recognition of the potential for conflict came sev-
eral months later when the protest activities of Mobilization for Youth
led the New York City bureaucracy to attempt to dismember it.24
Mayors and welfare functionaries were now being identified in the
press as the enemies of the organized poor; and umbrella agencies
looked less like consensual alliances against poverty than alliances
against the political organization of the slums. It became apparent that
in the hands of an antagonistic mayor an umbrella agency was a weapon,
23. Zimmerman is proudest of convincing the school administrators to accept a city
health clinic on their premises after the schools resisted for years any type of inter-agency
cooperation.
24. In Strategies for Implementing Social Change (unpublished manuscript in Co-
lumbia University School of Social Work), Albert Rose has quoted the sociologist Herbert
Gans on the process by which MFY and similar groups antagonize city goverment.
Through these programs the action agencies have encouraged and helped their clients
to fight city hall and the larger power structure, and to demand changes in the
allocation of public funds, the quality and distribution of public services, and the
distribution of political power generally. . . . When the action agencies began to
take over traditional functions of established agencies, or set up substitutes for them.
or otherwise threatened powerful interests, these fought back by putting pressure on
the action agencies. Since city hall and individual elements in the power structure
usually participated in setting up the action agencies in the first place, and dominate
their boards of trustees, they had no real difficulty in demanding a halt to political
activities or to any others that stepped on influential toes. Id. at 29.
MFY had displeased New York officials as early as January 1964, when a group of 26
school principals claimed that Mobilization was spreading dissatisfaction in the Lower
East Side neighborhood. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1964, p. 1, coL 4). But the city did not turn
against MFY until August. Then Deputy Mayor Paul Screvane conducted a highly publi-
cized investigation into the left-wing histories of some Mobilization employees, and
several newspapers reported charges from inside the Police Department that the notorious
Harlem rent strike leader, Jesse Gray, had been plotting Mobilization's own rent strike
strategy. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1964, p. 78, col. 2; Id., Aug. 17, 1964, p. 1, col. 4). A few
weeks later, Sen. Javits warned that Mobilization would have to curtail its social action
program if it wanted to retain federal and city supports, (N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1964, p. 207,
col. 5); within a few days, MFY's administrative director, J. F. McCarthy, had retired,
claiming reasons of health.
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far superior to a network of self-centered welfare bureaucracies, for con-
solidating his power in the local poverty program and excluding the
troublesome poor. Once "involvement of the poor" became political
participation of the poor, city-wide social service cooperation and the
organization of the slums ceased to be compatible statutory goals.
Although few people saw the potential conflict between slum or-
ganizations and the city politicians, 25 the tension now seems an in-
evitable product of the organizations' purposes. The poor people's
groups were conceived, in part, as a corrective to the psychological
devastation of bureaucratic welfare methods. As public aid agencies
proliferated after the New Deal, they created an imposing network of
institutions which permeate the culture of urban poverty. Today the
representative victim of urban poverty is housed in massive public
projects, fed and clothed with Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
funds. Welfare investigators judge his morals; case workers try to cope
with his psychic maladjustments. There is no clear separation between
the system's function as dispenser of the dole and its moralizing and
socializing activities. Unconstrained by consistent administrative or
judicial review, public aid officials are free to distribute welfare bene-
fits as a reward for approved behaviour.20
These indignities inspired criticism of the welfare system which
dismissed its accomplishments as marginal benefits, submerged in the
"debilitating and demoralizing" effect of the poor person's dependent
relationship to the welfare functionary.27 Welfare officials themselves
25. The members of the drafting group most likely to have been aware of the poten-
tial for political conflict were the ones associated with the Juvenile Delinquency Program
(e.g., Sanford Kravitz, David Hackett). They were in a peculiarly favorable position to see
concealed tendencies in the relations between poor people's organizations and city
government.
26. "[E]normous organization energy is invested by public welfare personnel in the
determination of initial worthiness and eligibility for the dole and, once approved, the
recipient is the object of continuing surveillance to make sure he continues to meet these
conditions." Cloward & Piven, Politics, Professionalism, and Poverty 39-40, Nov. 1965
(unpublished paper for Columbia University School of Social Work conference on "The
Role of Government in Promoting Social Change'; cf. GE.LHORN, INDIVIDUAL FIoMOM &
GovmERNb.NT RESmtRAINTS (1956).
27. The indictment of welfare bureaucracy fell heaviest on the system's characteristic
administrative style.
Many persons who have dedicated their lives and devoted themselves, wisely or un-
wisely, to the task of providing some form of social service have been challenged,
not on the basis of incompetence but on the basis of lack of regard for human worth
and the denial of basic opportunity to vast numbers of children.
Rose, Strategies for Implementing Social Change 26, Nov. 1965 (unpublished manuscript
at Columbia School of Social Work). This passage was written by a social work theorist
associated with the critics of public aid bureaucracies and their case work methods. But
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frequently played the part of obliging strawmen and published studies
of poverty which credited their image as contemptuous overseers of the
poor. A report, issued in 1962 by the Cook County Bureau of Public
Aid, referred to the welfare recipient as a "child-adult" and repeated
the slogan, "social uplift through social discipline," which had been
invented a year earlier by the Bureau's director, Raymond Hilliard.,
In their search for a counterweight to a system in which the poor
appeared as helpless dependents, some social work theorists turned to
social action which they identified with militant slum organizations.
Their hope was that these organizations, by acquiring influence for
their members, would help the poor overcome the psychology of power-
lessness. 29 This concern with the powerlessness and dependency of the
poor unavoidably led the social work theorists into city politics and to
a political interpretation of section 202(a)(3). In slum neighborhoods,
the city was often the local landlord 0 and enforcer of morals3 ' as well
as the source of most people's subsistence income. To base militant
social action on the resentments of people whose lives were so entangled
with public subsidies and regulations was inevitably to invite the
antagonism of the city government.
Even where resentments focused on private persons, the organizer
was likely to be drawn into political conflict. City government may not
-as some organizers seemed to believe-consist of a conspiracy against
the poor, manipulated by an Establishment of ward politicians, slum
lords, and welfare bureaucrats. But social action workers who promoted
rent strikes soon discovered that the slums exist on the tolerance of
housing inspectors and that sometimes the landlord is not unaffiliated
with the mayor's office. 2
few of the revisionists moderated their attack on the welfare establishment with s)ynpa-
thetic psychological analysis; cf., Wickenden, The Public and Welfare Administration, in
PRoCrrymws or mm H.E.W. CONFERENcm ON Ex.rNsION or LmL SERvicEs To TH Poor
(19 4).
28. Srn i, CaRsis iN BLAC AND Wr= 313-14 (1964).
29. The result of social action of this kind is a concurrent change in the view which
the poor have of themselves and in the view of the poor by the outside world. There
is a softening of the destructive social reality and immediate psychological returns
to the poor, although not without hostile reactions from advataged persons and
organizations with known or hidden vested interests in maintenance of the areas of
poverty.
Haggstrom, The Power of the Poor, in R.ssrN, MENTA. HEALH or "nm Poon (1964).
30. For the difficulties of applying a housing code, even to the city's own buildings,
see N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1966, p. 77, col. 8.
31. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YAr. L.J 733 (1964); Note, 36 NoMni
DAm LAw. 56 (1960).
32. A perennial subject for muckraking journalism in Chicago is the slum properties
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The theoreticians were often unprepared for the enemies they ac-
quired when their opinions of the public aid bureaucracy moved out
of the professional journals and on to the picket signs. For an experi-
enced labor or civil rights organizer there would be nothing unsettling
about the political entanglements of militant social action. But social
action enthusiasts came from an entirely different organizing tradition.
Many of them arrived at their current welfare theories while organizing
teenagers for juvenile delinquency projects which enjoyed the coopera-
tion of city authorities.33 This preparation was not adequate for the
political problems the social action theoreticians encountered when
they obtained older constituencies in places like New York's Lower
East Side. 34
Saul Alinsky: Rub Raw the Sores
This transformation of "involvement of the poor" into an ideology
of conflict with city hall brought the social action theorists and their
groups closer to Saul Alinsky. Since he organized the Back of the Yards
project in Chicago thirty years ago, Alinsky has occupied the same
ground that the social action groups have been approaching only re-
cently. Many social action theorists would agree by now that aggravated
resentments are the most practical basis for mass organizations in the
slums. But they reached this conclusion only after experimenting with
other, milder techniques for "involving the poor"-neighborhood im-
provement projects, for example, and several versions of cooperation
with the city authorities. Alinsky, on the other hand, has never doubted
the union of social therapy and militant politics. In Alinsky's catechism,
a neighborhood regenerates itself only by taking its problems into its
own hands and forcing concessions from the local power structure.
Frustration turned to anger provides the energy for this social change.
of IZ. Horowitz, onetime commissioner of housing for Cook County, and a Democratic
leader in the 24th ward. Interview with Nicholas Von Hoffman, reporter for Daily News,
in Chicago, March 5, 1966.
33. The development of social action theory at the Columbia University School of
Social Work, for example, has consistently reflected the changing political circumstances
of Mobilization For Youth.
34. The progression from a politically neutral concern with organizing the slums to a
fully engaged animus for the city "Establishment" is reflected in the writings of the social
action theorists. During the poverty program's formative stage Richard Cloward, the most
influential of the group, was describing the government as a partner in the effort to
involve the poor. See CLOWARD & OHUN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960). Two years
later, in an article bearing all the bitterness of an SDS pamphlet on urban politics, the
city appears as the holder of a controlling, vested interest in the maintenance of dis-
organized slums. Cloward and Piven, Politics, Professionalism, and Poverty, Nov. 1965
(unpublished paper for Columbia University School of Social Work).
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The community organizer digs into a morass of resignation, hope-
lessness, and despair and works with the local people in articulat-
ing (or 'rubbing raw') their resentments .... When those prominent
in the status quo turn and label you an agitator, they are com-
pletely correct, for that is, in one word, your function-to agitate
to the point of conflict.35
Although Alinsky's groups are not above doing business with city hall,
a perpetually antagonistic pose is one of their operating principles.3
They rely on a mood of anger which they dare not contradict with a
compromising tone.
While adapting the Alinsky Method, the social action theorists have
not yet developed institutional solutions to his groups' characteristic
problems. The central difficulty for an Alinsky organization is to sus-
tain an angry mood after the initial organizing issue has passed, and
the members discover that even a successful protest has not brought
fundamental changes to the neighborhood. After a march on city hall
the group cannot return to other activities and wait for the next protest
issue to come along. Protest is the organization's only business.
Besides leading to excessive expectations the Alinsky groups' reliance
on sustained agitation has made it difficult for them to honor the prin-
ciple of democratic control. For all their talk about "what the people
want," they sometimes practice a version of "shareholder democracy"
in which the members merely ratify the leaders' strategy-3 7 Their mass
meetings are devices to aggravate neighborhood discontents and iden-
tify the organization as the appropriate outlet for their frustrations.
Some social work theorists, such as Warren Haggstrom and Richard
Cloward, in their excursions into the slums, have made more of an
effort to maintain democratic control. They divide the mass organiza-
35. Quoted in SIumm&N, CaUsis iN BLACK AND WIm 335 (1954).
36. Alinsky makes a point of disassociating himself from the social scientists who have
created the pluralist model of American politics. "They would rather talk about politics
being a matter of accommodation... consensus-and not this conflict business," he says.
"This is typical academic drivel. How do you have consensus before you have conflict?
There has to be a rearrangement of power and then you get consensus." Alinsky, A Pro-
fessional Radical Moves in on Rochester, Harper's Magazine, July, 1965, p. 59. This does
more to emphasize Alinsky's toughness than to differentiate him from the orthodox
political scientists for whom conflict is also the beginning of politics. See TntmtMAN, Tim
GoPFmEN-rrAL PROCESS 502-03 (1962). In fact, in strictly political terms the only distinction
between them is tonal, for Alinsky's pronouncements are really a shrill version of conven-
tional, pluralist interest group theory.
37. Alinsky's Rochester organizer, Edward Chambers, is particularly given to disowning
personal policy or responsibility with the phrase: "what the people Want." Interview with
Edward Chambers in Rochester, N.Y., July 11, 1965. But his first exercise in Alinsky-style
democracy was a mass meeting with 1,000 delegates. The New Republic, June 26, 1965,
p. 15.
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tion into local groups which are small enough to practice "participatory
democracy," and in the style of Quaker meetings, converse with the
members until a consensus emerges from the group.88 But this arrange-
ment too may degenerate into a guise for imposing the organizer's pro-
gram on the less articulate and single-minded neighborhood residents.
Despite the difficulty of making organizations of the poor democratic,
social action enthusiasts were able to establish their groups in the
public mind as the model of "maximum participation of the poor." In
the Wall Street Journal, 9 no less than in The New Republic, the phrase
began to signify a militant slum organization, asserting its members'
interests against the mayor and pre-empting the functions of the wel-
fare bureaucracies. By now section 202(a)(3) has been widely interpreted
as a mandate for OEO to finance these militant organizations. It has be-
come impossible for the participation provision to lie quietly within a
Community Action Title prescribing institutional alliances which in-
evitably become the political instrument of city hall.
OEO, THE MAYORS, AND THEIR INSURGENT POOR
The mayors do not assume their new role as antagonists of the or-
ganized poor without regrets. A nostalgic attachment to New Deal
political alignments remains, long after race began to count for more
in urban politics than the memory of Franklin Roosevelt. No doubt,
Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago is shocked by the catcalls he receives
at NAACP rallies. Indeed, if the poor had made their initial political
demands in Washington instead of at city hall, the mayors and their
poor could probably have continued to live at peace in the shelter of
the local Democratic parties. Most mayors would gladly combine with
poor people's organizations to bring home a larger basket of federal
welfare and education funds.40
But one subject on which most mayors are inflexible is the distribu-
tion of power in the cities they govern. Even where the poor receive
decent housing and abundant social services, mayors are skittish about
the potential for political opposition in the slums. If the poor obtained
88. The Syracuse Community Development Association, a hybrid project administered
by social work theoreticians and Alinsky veterans, practiced "participatory democracy." One
SCDA worker described a meeting in the Pioneer housing project as "the most beautiful
thing I've ever seen. People who aren't supposed to be articulate saying this Is what they
want, this is what they need. They couldn't agree on a chairman, so they chose two: one
Negro and one white. It was beautiful." Interview with Phyllis Ferro, of the Syracuse
Community Development Association, in Syracuse, N.Y., July 10, 1965.
39. See The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
40. Certainly the charade of honoring participation of the poor, which the mayors
perform for Congress and OEO, would be less transparent if the mayors could display
innocuous, but indigenous, organizations of the poor.
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influence and patronage commensurate with their ballot strength they
might disrupt longstanding allocations of power which keep many
mayors in office. 4 '
The mayors' adjustment to the organized poor has been retarded
even further by their image as conciliatory figures, above factional
struggles for political power. In the mid-1950's, the "good" mayors be-
gan to be seen as high-minded representatives of "good government." 42
It seemed that the time had passed when rascally mayors, like James
Gurley of Boston, discharged their obligations to the poor through
extortion. The enlightened mayor cleaned up the city by replacing
party hacks with blue-ribbon committees and downtown slums with
urban renewal high-risers.43 This hygienic view of urban politics em-
bodied in OEO's umbrella doctrine, assumed city hall's traditional suc-
cess at accommodating the poor who continued to support the local
Democratic party at the polls. The mayor's real task, therefore, was to
conciliate business as well as to satisfy the middle class' desire for a
prosperous, well-ordered city. In return, the business community
would enter an alliance with the city social service agencies and the
Urban Renewal Authority to create "a better and more beautiful city
for rich and poor alike." A mayor would have to be uncommonly free
of self-indulgence to abandon easily this gratifying view of his role in
urban affairs. Slum organizers are challenging an important source of
the mayor's self-justification when they present urban renewal as
euphemistic "Negro removal," and city hall judicial reform as an in-
novation that merely eliminates Negro jobs.
41. In the general competition of ethnic groups for a place on the Democratic ticket,
the Negroes (along with the Poles) have not gained in accordance with their numbers
in. the city. No Negro has ever been slated by the party for one of the politically
important posts--those posts in the city and county administration which control
patronage. The number of Negroes elected to well-paying and prestigious judgeships
has been far fewer than the Negro proportion of the total electorate would suggest.
Despite tremendous population gains since 1940, the Negro group continues to elect
only one state senator.
WrlsoN, NGRo PoLurcs 68 (1960).
42. Robert Dahl's description of Mayor Richard Lee, assembling a consensus for New
Haven redevelopment, is the most complete single-city presentation of this shift in emphasis
among urban Democratic mayors. DAHL, WHo GovER s (1961).
43. Banfield and Wilson describe the task of a "machine" mayor in search of good-
government appeal. "To do this, he must minimize, or at least render inconspicuous, his
use of patronage and payoffs, and he must exert himself to find 'blue ribbon' candidates
for important offices and 'professional' administrators for important departments and to
inaugurate civic projects that will suit the 'good government' voter without costing very
much. In effect, he must take political resources away from those central-city wards where
the machine is strong and give them to the independent voters in the 'newspaper' wards
and in the independent suburbs ... ." BANFrI & WusoN, Crry PoLmcs 123-24 (1963).
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OEO's Dilemma
The conflict between the mayors and the social action groups, which
undermined consensual community action, has left OEO's Community
Action Program without a coherent objective. Militant social action,
as the most fashionable idea in social work theory, originally had a
strong appeal for OEO's top administrators, many of whom acquired a
taste at the Peace Corps for voguish social service. In addition, some
of the most prominent social action enthusiasts have been employed
inside the Anti-Poverty agency and, particularly during the first year,
have lobbied energetically for their political interpretation of the pro-
vision requiring participation of the poor.44 But neither of these in-
fluences on OEO has compensated for the failure of militant social
action to acquire imposing political support outside the Anti-Poverty
Agency. The groups with the strongest commitment to the political
interpretation have been social work theorists, federal bureaucrats, and
neighborhood organizers-none of whom could match the influence of
city hall.
The diffuseness of the congressional mandate for participation of
the poor has made OEO susceptible to political pressure from mayors
who interpret the participationist sub-section to exclude support for
politically involved organizations of the poor. The Anti-Poverty Agency
cannot defend these organizations by invoking a statutory obligation
to underwrite poor people's groups. Nor can the Agency rely on the
usual politics of special interest legislation which match the power of
the group served by the bill against the influence of its antagonists.
Section 202(a)(3) is directed at groups that are currently outside politics,
and OEO's potential constituency of urban poor counts for little be-
side the mayors who help elect Democratic presidents every four years.
Because of these political constraints, OEO has emphasized the refer-
ence to feasibility in administering the provision for "maximum feasible
participation" of the poor. The more insistent the militant spokesmen
for the poor and the weaker the city politicians, the more willing OEO
has been to fund applicants outside the umbrella agencies or to urge
the acceptance of dissidents on community action boards.
In general, OEO has applied three community action policies:
1) In some cities, notably Chicago, OEO has turned over the com-
munity action program to the local government and left the organized
poor to contend, unassisted, with city hall umbrella agencies.
44. They included William Haddad, who has since left his job as Inspector General of
OEO; Edgar S. Cahn, a special assistant to Shriver; Richard W. Boone, who has left the
Community Action Program to head the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty; and Sanford L.
Kravitz, chief of research and program development, Community Action Program.
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2) Where political circumstances have been most favorable, OEO
has funded directly neighborhood social action groups. The Syracuse
University project, until it lost its grant last December, was the most
prominent example of this experimental policy.
3) Elsewhere OEO has tried to mediate between the social action
organizers and their antagonists in city hall and the welfare bureaucracy.
The compromise policy has had its fullest expression in cities such as
Philadelphia where the indigenous poor were allowed to elect repre-
sentatives to community action boards, previously populated by city
hall appointees.
OEO's policy of variable response has succeeded in "involving the
poor" in several poverty programs, but its contribution to the political
organization of the slums has been negligible. Even in the cities con-
sidered ripe for the direct funding policy, the mayors have been strong
enough to force OEO to withdraw its local commitment to militant
social action. And in most elections to the umbrella boards, the poor
have merely ratified their established political leadership because no
one has been able to compete successfully with existing political or-
ganizations in the slums.
1. Chicago: City Hall Anti-Poverty
The War on Poverty, as conducted in Chicago, is a commonplace
supplementary grant proram, like air pollution control, for the discre-
tionary use of the city government and affiliated welfare agencies. Mayor
Daley assumes a proprietary interest in local community action and
tolerates participation of the poor only through his own political or-
ganization. By April, 1965, the city's infant community action program
had created, in the central office alone, 469 "non-professional" jobs
which require no special qualifications. 45 And one of the 24 projected
neighborhood "urban progress centers" had already hired 50 representa-
tives to the local poor. In the wrong hands, this patronage could under-
write a challenge to Daley's organization or, at least, weaken its exclu-
sive franchise as the agency for "non-professional" public employment
in Chicago. No wonder, then, that aspirants to jobs as neighborhood
representatives are advised to get letters of recommendation from their
precinct captains who, in turn, circulate appropriate application
forms.
46
The Chicago poverty program is administered by officials borrowed
from the Cook County Department of Public Aid, which under Ray-
45. Hearings, 332.
46. Chicago Daily News, April 8, 1965, reprinted in Hearings, 355.56.
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mond Hilliard has been a stronghold of the case-work approach to
social welfare. It was Hilliard and Dr. Deton J. Brooks, Jr., now direc-
tor of the Chicago community action program, who in "Blackboard
Curtain," a study of juvenile delinquency, originated the slogan, "social
uplift through social discipline. ' 47 Brooks keeps the program closely
affiliated with the city's welfare apparatus.48 The neighborhood Urban
Progress Centers, which Mayor Daley calls "little city halls," are de-
scribed by others as emergency relief for the office shortage at the De-
partment of Public Aid.49
None of Chicago's anti-poverty funds has become seed-money for
organizations of the poor that would cause any trouble for the Daley
organization. The only serious challenge came from a group called the
West Side Ministers Federation which requested $300,000 from OEO
last spring to propagate the Alinsky method. At a meeting attended
by an applauding representative from OEO, Robert Shackford, and a
silent Dr. Brooks, the Reverend Lynward Stevenson, president of The
Woodlawn Organization (TWO), Alinsky's most successful neighbor-
hood group, asked a Lawndale audience: "How long are we going to
stand for people planning for us as if we were children, while they
sit downtown and munch their steaks and drink their champagne?"5 0
Shackford's response was: "I've got your message. And I'll take it to
Washington." But the proposal died on the desk of the OEO bureau-
cracy. The Agency has felt constrained to appropriate all of Chicago's
anti-poverty funds through Brooks' Committee on Urban Opportunity,
which in turn is satisfied with the program offered by Lawndale's "little
city hall." There in a converted field house, separated from the neigh-
47. SiLBEMRmA, op. cit. supra note 35, at 314; Chicago Daily News, April 6, 1965, rc-
printed in Hearings 351.
48. While maintaining the traditions of the Bureau of Public Aid, community action
officials are also sensitive to the political consequences of their War on Poverty. Their
viligance is not limited to the credentials of the program's "non-professional" employees.
A director of an Urban Progress Center wanted to add three organizers for JOIN, the local
SDS project, to his advisory board last spring. But the JOIN members had previously
alarmed the city by demanding the conversion of an inactive parking lot into a playground,
and the director's suggestion died in Brooks' office. Interview with Chicago Community
Action official, in Chicago, June 10, 1965.
49. The Lawndale Urban Progress Center calls to mind Josef K.'s working quarters In
the movie version of The Trial. Several hundred typewriters and file cabinets occupy a
single, enormous room. At the entrance to the office is a clerk who collects finger prints
from the indigenous poor before they are interviewed for community action jobs. One
young man, with a transistor radio cord hanging from his ear in mute protest, was marched
to the finger print desk by his determined girl friend. When be confessed that he had
forgotten his prints, he was told: "You people, can't remember anything, can you?"
50. Chicago Daily News, April 5, 1965, reprinted in Hearings, 348.
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borhood by the no man's land of Douglas Park, the poor are returned
to the labyrinth of the Chicago welfare agencies.
One month after the Lawndale meeting, Dr. Brooks defended his
program during an appearance before the House Education and Labor
Committee. He noted that hardly anything could happen in Lawndale
without the participation of the poor. "It would be awfully difficult not
to get right down to the poor. The ministerial groups, again, are on
[sic] there. But it would be very difficult not to get doun to it.""' Mean-
while Mayor Daley was making a substantive concession. He announced
to the press that fifty of Lawndale's residents would join the payroll as
the center's representatives to the neighborhood poor52
The director of the Lawndale "little city hall," Clarence Cash, is
more candid than his superiors about the prevailing attitude in Chicago
toward participation of the poor. He makes clear his scepticism about
the social value of participationism or any other kind of representative
politics inside the poverty program.
"Nobody really represents the poor," he says.53 And this atomized
condition which for others is the compelling reason to organize the
slums is for Cash a reason to look elsewhere for good ideas. "When the
poor come up with good suggestions, we'll listen. But they haven't yet."
Cash sees the hand of Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation in the
proposal of the West Side Ministers Federation for a separate Lawn-
dale program and doubts that the local poor had much to do with it.
"That proposal wasn't written by Negroes with an eighth grade educa-
tion," he says.
"What right do the Federation ministers have to speak for the poor?"
he asks. "The ward committeemen have more contact with the poor
people than they do. When I go into the bars around Lawndale, I see
more of the poor than the ministers see on a Sunday morning."
2. Syracuse: Direct Funding of Social Action
Until December, 1965, OEO was subsidizing both involvement of
the poor and political participation in Syracuse. In an evacuated federal
court building, Ben Zimmerman of the local umbrella agency (Syracuse
Crusade for Opportunity) was building an alliance of existing city
welfare institutions. Meanwhile, at the Community Development Cen-
ter (SCDA) organizers, paid with anti-poverty funds, were sent into the
5. Hearings,.240.
52. Interview with Peter Doole, offcial of Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity,
in Chicago, June 10, 1965.
53. Interview with Clarence Cash, June 11, 1955.
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local slums to register voters and, incidentally, to remind the poor
"which politicians keep their promises."5 4
As competitors for OEO's local community action franchise, the two
groups were unavoidably suspicious and resentful of each other. Origi-
nally, SCDA-director Fred Ross had come from an Alinsky project
among migrant workers in California to start autonomous community
organizations in Syracuse for Zimmerman's Crusade. The two men
later fell out over a voter registration drive that was losing friends for
the Crusade among Syracuse Republicans. Ross and Warren Hagg-
strom, a social action theoretician from Syracuse University, then ob-
tained for the University a separate research and demonstration grant
from OEO to explore new approaches to participation of the poor.50
Nevertheless, the Crusade and SCDA seemed capable of abrasive co-
existence. Zimmerman was not the typical umbrella agent, moving up
the ladder in a welfare bureaucracy; he had worked with the President's
Juvenile Delinquency Program that inspired the participationist pro-
vision in the Economic Opportunity Act. Last summer he was still
speaking in the tones of the early '60's about cooperating with city au-
thorities "to involve the poor."57 The acrimonious poverty politics
which turned some of his JD colleagues to militancy made Zimmerman
wary of giving offense to city hall. "Mobilization for Youth showed how
important it is to get broad support," he said. "You can't picket city
hall on Monday and arrange for park equipment on Tuesday."5 8 But
unlike most umbrellamen, Zimmerman was familiar and sympathetic
with the ideas that motivate slum organizers. A city government with
so enlightened a community action director might have been expected
to provide relatively tolerant opposition for SCDA.
Syracuse's political circumstances also seemed to favor SCDA's sur-
vival. Mayor William F. Walsh was not the formidable enemy social
action groups usually encounter in city hall. A Republican in a city
that voted for both Kennedy and Johnson in 1964, he was poorly
situated to ask the White House to withdraw federal patronage from
SCDA.
But none of these advantages was sufficient to save SCDA. During
its single operating year, SCDA alienated most of the city bureaucracy
with "play-in's" at local parks and protests against the management of
54. Interview with Fred Ross, director of SCDA, in Syracuse, July 10, 1965.
55. Ibid.
56. Knoll & Witcover, Fighting Poverty-And City Hall, The Reporter, June 3, 19065,
p. 21.
57. Interview with Ben Zimmerman, in Syracuse, June 10, 1965.
58. Ibid.
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the city's public housing. SCDA also made an enemy of the influential
Niagara Mohawk Power Company which saw the group's influence be-
hind CORE's continual picketing against the corporation's employment
practices. 59 Then Mayor Walsh, already concerned about the Demo-
cratic bias of SCDA's registration drive, attended the 1964 mayors con-
ference where he was surprised to find his colleagues in firm control
of their local poverty programs.60 After the meeting, Walsh was less
constrained in attacking SCDA, and on one occasion he fulminated
against the group's "dangerous social experiment for storming city
hall."61
In coalition with offended bureaucrats and businessmen, Walsh in-
tervened with OEO to order Ross and Haggstrom back under the
Crusade's umbrella. In addition, the more influential big city mayors,
regarding Syracuse as a test case, may have been willing to assist even
a Republican city administration in order to defend their own interest
in city-controlled community action.
What of OEO's suggestion that SODA merge into the Crusade? The
original split over Ross' registration campaign probably demonstrates
the incompatibility of the two styles of community action in Syracuse.62
Social action thrives on conflict, while institutional alliances need good
will in high places. And a bridge between the two would require more
than Ben Zimmerman's earnest desire to "involve the poor."
3. Representatives of the Poor on the Umbrella Boards
In trying to accommodate the city politicians and the participation-
ists, OEO has urged the appointment of representatives of the poor to
central community action boards. This procedure honors, in theory, the
statute's conflicting goals by providing a unified community action
program, with representatives of the poor to protect the interests of
militant slum organizations. Among the three community action
strategies, it is the one OEO has pursued with the most apparent
conviction. 3
But even in seeking a representative version of participation of the
59. Knoll & Witcover, supra note 56.
60. Interview with Fred Ross, director of SCDA, in Syracuse, June 10, 1955.
61. Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1965, p. A2, col. 3.
62. Ross and Haggstrom would apparently prefer martyrdom to another spell under
the umbrella, so the question is probably academic. See Cloward & Elman, The First
Congress of the Poor, 202 The Nation 149, Feb. 7, 1966.
63. In contrast to OEO's reluctance to fund poor people's organizations directly, the
Anti-Poverty Agency has urged increased representation of the poor on the community
action boards in Chicago, Philadelphia, New Haven, Cleveland, Kansas City, Mo. and
Milwaukee.
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poor, OEO has not been much more successful than it has been in rec-
onciling the mayors to direct funding of poor people's organizations.
Many cities have been willing to appoint only an inconsequential num-
ber of emblematic poor to the community action boards. Because polit-
ical activity among the poor people is so diffuse, it is impossible to
identify their qualified representatives as accurately as labor leaders or
welfare agency representatives. Some mayors have exploited this confu-
sion by appointing "representatives of the poor" who serve themselves
and city hall better than they serve the poor. When the Chicago com-
mittee's distance from the poor was criticized last March, Dr. Brooks
added to the board a judge and a businessman who were old friends of
the Daley organization. Neither was distinguishable from the rest of
the Committee except by the color of his skin.04
Dissatisfaction with appointed representatives of the poor has created
a demand from slum neighborhoods for elections to the umbrella
boards. With their appeal to democratic sensibilities, elections have
become the most popular reform program among groups that are dis-
affected from local community action agencies. At least until March,
1966, OEO proselytized for elections to community action boards,0 5
urging in its Community Action Program Guide "the use, whenever
feasible, of traditional democratic approaches and techniques such as
group forum, and discussions, nominations, and balloting."0
The example of Philadelphia suggests, however, that elections are
largely symbolic unless they are preceded or accompanied by an or-
ganizing effort in slum neighborhoods to interest the poor in the issues
of the War on Poverty. The embarrassing voting percentages-some-
times as low as 1% 67-reflect the difficulty any group, except an estab-
lished city machine, has in organizing slum constituencies. The failure
in Philadelphia was not the fault of the electoral mechanics, which
might have facilitated the representation of neighborhood interests on
the city-wide board. In twelve slum areas, residents who met a reverse
income qualification 6s were to elect representatives to neighborhood
community action councils. Each council, in turn, was to appoint a
64. Chicago Daily News, April 5, 1965, reprinted in Hearings, 849.
65. In an appearance before the House Education & Labor Committee, Sargent Shrlver
questioned whether OEO would continue to finance elections to the boards. Noting the
small turn-out of eligible voters in most cities, he concluded that OEO was not getting Its
"money's worth" from the elections. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1966, p. 24, col. 3.
66. Program Guide at 18.
67. Only 2,659 of 400,000 eligible poor voted in the Los Angeles poverty election. See
N.Y. Times, March 4, 1966. Other voting percentage figures were 4.2% in Cleveland and
5.3% in Kansas City. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1966, and Feb. 20, 1966, p. 39, col. 1.
68. Interview with Isaiah W. Crippins, Esq., general counsel for PAAC, in Philadelphia,
July 5, 1965.
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member to the central community action board (Philadelphia Anti-
Poverty Action Committee or PAAC). The twelve representatives
would not constitute a majority of the 31-member board; but it seemed
that as umbrella group ratios go, the Philadelphia poor would be well
represented.
Before OEO forced Philadelphia to institute the plan, PAAC had
been under attack from the Citizens Emergency Committee, whose
counter-umbrella sheltered most of the poverty dissidents in the city.
The Emergency Committee might have been expected to provide an
effective coalition of canvassing organizations for the election. Instead,
the committee members were frustrated by divisions about election
tactics within their home organizations and found that even among
themselves they could agree on nothing except distaste for the PAAC
program. Among the organizations with members on the committee,
SNCC was puristicly attached to direct dealings between OEO and the
neighborhood poor, and would not be co-opted by an umbrella group
election plan. The unions were enthusiastic about elections, but they
knew hardly anyone in the neighborhoods with eligible poverty voters. Go
The NAACP remained the only organization that could claim a mass
following in the Philadelphia slums and certainly the only one with
the capacity to mobilize voter interest in the poverty election. But
NAACP President Cecil Moore had earler made his peace with PAAC.
The counsel of the Philadelphia NAACP, Isaiah Crippins, had been
appointed general counsel of the Action Committee at $15,000 a year,
after which Moore ceased agitating against the local poverty program
and sent his picketers to Girard College.70
Once the election plan was announced the NAACP campaigned
quietly and effectively for its own candidates, playing impeccably the
part of a successful city machine. The Association made no effort to
arouse an electorate that would hold the new board members to their
representative function.7' PAAC managed a brief and uneventful
election. At an early town meeting for eligible voters in the poverty
election, discussion was limited to electoral mechanics and the structure
of the Action Committee. All topics relating to the content of poverty
programs were ruled out of order.72 The electorate responded by losing
interest in poverty politics; the total attendance at the two town meet-
69. Interview with Mrs. Mattie Humphrey, member of the Citizens Emergency Com-
mittee, in Philadelphia, July 6, 1965.
70. Interview with Mr. Clarence Harris, member of the Citizens Emergency Committee,
in Philadelphia, July 6, 1965.
71. Interview with Philadelphia dvil rights leader, July, 1965.
72. Interview with Mrs. Mattie Humphrey, member of the Citizens Emergency Com-
mittee, in Philadelphia, July 6, 1965.
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ings was approximately the same as the number of voters in the election
(13,000 or 3%o of the eligible voters). 73
The candidates who were elected have behaved in a manner under-
standable in officials with a lethargic constituency, unaware of any
personal stake in the poverty program. In a straw poll, the representa-
tives voted to call themselves "typical residents" instead of repre-
sentatives of the poor.74 They showed a passing interest in a juvenile
delinquency program devised by the PAAC staff, and had it amended to
provide more jobs for the poor.75 But their real preoccupation has been
with jobs for PAAC committeemen, in particular a plan, as yet un-
ratified by OEO, to pay each of them $500 per year.70
NEW ORGANIZING STRATEGIES
OEO's record as a patron of social action has followed the pattern of
Chicago, Syracuse, and Philadelphia wherever the agency has become
involved in an effort to organize new political constituencies in the
slums. 77 By the end of 1965, OEO functionaries were no longer prod-
ding mayors to tolerate opposition within the local poverty program.
The Syracuse University project had lost its organizing grant; the
Newark program was in danger of annexation by the city govern-
ment;78 and several of the OEO officials who had lobbied most vigor-
73. Ridgeway, Philadelphia Polls the Poor, The New Republic, June 5, 1965, p. 8.
74. Interviews with Miss Christine Allen, elected neighborhood representative to
PAAC, in Philadelphia, July 3, 1965 and with Mrs. Mattie Humphrey, member of the
Citizens Emergency Committee, July 4, 1965. One member of PAAC, Urban League ex-
ecutive director Andrew Freeman, confidently predicted that the elected poor would soon
learn to behave like their social betters on the PAAC board. "Some of them are hot.heads
now, trying to prove that they're as smart as anybody else," Mr. Freeman observed, "but
they're just like union shop stewards. In a little while they learn some sense and pretty
soon the company can hire them as foreman." Interview with Andrew Freeman, In Phil-
adelphia, July 5, 1965.
75. Philadelphia Tribune, June 12, 1965.
76. Interview with Miss Christine Allen, elected neighborhood representative to P'AAC,
in Philadelphia, July 3, 1965.
77. The poverty election in the Hill Neighborhood of New Haven also illustrates the
importance of community organization to the election formula for obtaining representa-
tion of the poor. The New Haven election had no property qualification, and the local
social action group, the Hill Neighborhood Union had to contend with voting middle
class whites whose loyalty was to the local Democratic party. The fourth ward, where the
Neighborhood Association had engaged in only limited organizing activities and which
contained relatively large remnants of the old white community, returned the Democratic
ward chairman and an alderman as its representatives to the community action board. On
the other hand, in the sixth ward, the heartland of the Neighborhood Union, two
organizers defeated candidates closely affiliated with the existing leadership of the com-
munity action program (Community Progress, Incorporated). Cf. Yale Civil Rights News-
letter (unpublished, available from the Yale Council on Civil Rights).
78. The Newark War on Poverty began with the vital combination of a weak mayor
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ously for participation of the poor had left the Agency.70 Entrenched
political organizations were in control of local poverty programs, with
ornamental poor scattered among the community action boards as an
obeisance to the principle of participation.
Strengthened Local and Regional Offices
Although OEO seems to have disentangled itself from the organized
poor for political reasons, some critics blame the program's retreat on
institutional faflings---in particular, the passivity of OEO's local and
regional personnel. The critics see local community action hierarchies
as an obstacle, created by OEO's attachment to the umbrella doctrine,
that prevents the agency from financing the organization of the slums.
Accordingly, their plan is to replace the mayor's community action
director by a federal anti-poverty office which would dispense OEO
funds. Local OEO staffs, now occupied by the mechanics of processing
applications, would be greatly expanded, and some personnel might be
sent directly into the slums as organizers. These invigorated local
offices, the critics believe, could open a direct route to Washington for
the organized poor, and, at the same time, preserve the ideal of centra-
lized community action which presently ties OEO to the mayor's
apparatus.
(Hugh J. Addonizio) and a strong poverty director (Cyril D. Tyson, a founder of Haryou)
that makes it possible for local poverty programs to promote independent organizations
of the poor. Moreover, Newark is one of the two large American cities with a non.white
majority, as well as the one with the largest percentage of certified poor. For those with
visions of the urban Negro entering the city power structure on the wings of the poverty
program, Newark was the obvious test case. Through the spring and summer Tyson's
United Community Corporation maintained its independence. There were elections to the
program's neighborhood advisory boards, and in one of them (Local Board '3) participants
in NCUP (Newark Community Union Project), the Newark SDS project, obtained a work-
ing majority. An organizer as "unco-optable" as Tom Hayden of the NCUP project could
talk seriously, if cautiously, about the Newark poverty program as a route into local
politics for independent, self-respecting poor people. But this experiment in elective
democracy within the poverty program tainted UCC with NCUP's campaign against the
Newark welfare institutions, and the city government was moved to action. In December
a city council report accused the corporation of being "primarily" concerned with "political
action" as well as the usual "healthy salaries and material goods." It proposed to sub-
ordinate UCC to a city commission, including the mayor, four councilmen and four ap-
pointees of the mayor (New York Times, Dec. 8, 1965, p. 61, coL 7; id., Dec. 12, 1965, p. 81,
col. 1). In an attempt at coexistence, Tyson agreed to the "super-umbrella" and as an
additional concession submitted a plan to the UCC membership for adding twenty-seven
poor and twenty-six mayor's men simultaneously to the board. But the mayors candidates
were rejected at an open UCC meeting in February, and later several Newark politicians
indicated that they would not be satisfied with the degree of control provided by the
"super-umbrella" agency alone. New York Times, Feb. 19, 196, p. 56, coL 1.
79. Both William Haddad and Richard Boone left OEO in late 1965.
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It is not, ho'wever, OEO's attachment to centralized community
action that prevents the Agency from supporting slum organizations.
In Syracuse, the Anti-Poverty Agency was willing to circumvent the
mayor's community action board but capitulated before the displeasure
of a weak Republican mayor. And in Newark, OEO let city hall attack
a politically independent poverty program although the director was
prepared to uphold his responsibility to coordinate the agencies and to
ensure the participation of the poor. OEO's susceptibility to political
pressure is what keeps the Agency from financing militant social action,
and this weakness would survive any number of institutional inno-
vations.80
The presence of OEO employees on the front lines might even
increase OEO's diffidence in its relations with social action groups. In
the past, when mayors have complained about the politics of a militant
OEO-grantee, the Agency has been able to disown responsibility with
the claim that it is the organization's intimacy with the poor rather
its politics that is OEO's statutory concern. But the Agency could not
make this excuse to the Democratic National Committee if OEO's own
personnel were involved in making policy for the neighborhood
organization.
The critics may also overestimate field representatives' potential as
progressive allies of the organized poor. After a period in office, a federal
official often becomes an accessory of the city bureaucracy with which he
associates. He comes to share its suspicion of any innovation that might
upset the local power structure."' There is no reason to expect that
OEO field representatives, presently eager to organize the poor, would
resist this transition from an experimental, national perspective to a
conservative local point of view. The future, if any, of OEO support
for militant social action is a relationship, free of intermediaries,
between Washington and neighborhood 202(a)(3) organizations.
With OEO a prisoner of its political susceptibilities, neighborhood
organizers need to develop more imaginative strategies for their
80. The support OEO currently gives its field representatives, on the rare occasions
when they intervene publicly in local poverty politics, does not suggest that a corps of
interventionist local representatives could do very much for participation of the poor.
Robert Shackford, OEO's man in Chicago, announced last spring that an "Ideal" com-
munity action program would include representatives from civil rights groups and the
oppositionist Catholic urban affairs department. (Chicago Daily News, April 5, 1965, re-
printed in Hearings, 350). The Chicago poverty program failed to respond, and the money
kept coming from OEO.
81. See, e.g., Lipset, Bureaucracy and Social Change, in REAzaD IN BURaAUCnvY 221-32
(Merton, Gray, Hockey & Selvin ed. 1952); for theoretical discussion of the problem ce
SELZNicK, TVA AND THE GRAss RoOTs 250-59 (1949).
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dealings with the Anti-Poverty Agency and city governments. At
present, organizers often treat the local political system as an obstacle
to be circumvented simply by quoting section 202(a)(3). But there are
divisions and weaknesses in apparently monolithic city governments
which poor people's organizations could exploit to undercut the mayor's
power to exclude them from local poverty appropriations. Slum organ-
izers could follow at least three approaches toward antagonistic city
governments and a diffident OEO.
1) Organizers could ally themselves with sympathetic elements in city
politics whose influence on the mayor could help make a place in the
city poverty program for organizations of the poor.
2) By obtaining private funds, slum organizations could establish
themselves independently of the poverty program, and might become
strong enough to assert an undeniable claim to a share of OEO's local
appropriations.
3) If slum neighborhoods were organized around the performance of
economic or social functions rather than around pure political protest,
slum organizations could make opposition embarrassing for city hall
(who could complain about a new butcher shop with honest scales?)
without conceding the long-run objective of political influence for the
poor. In addition, business co-operatives or credit unions would per-
form a continuing function for the neighborhood and thereby avoid the
protest group's dependence on symbolic victories over city hall.
I. Alliance with Reform Movement
It is understandable that neighborhood organizers have seen the local
Democratic party as a machine for converting a promising federal
program into a source of political patronage for the mayor. But this
monolithic perspective obscures an opportunity to exploit the faction-
alism of urban politics.
In almost every city, there is a self-styled reform group with some
influence on city government and a participationist creed which coin-
cides with the political interpretation of section 202(a)(3).12 As a group
which takes its principles seriously, reformers should be attracted
easily to the banner of participation of the poor. Militant organizations
of the poor, in turn, could provide the long-sought popular base for
the reformers' advanced social programs. Unlike most mayors, the re-
82. For reform groups, participationism is "a normative principle inseparable from
the idea of democracy itself." BANm & WiLSON, Crry PoLrncs 258 (1963); Wilson, Politics
and Reform in American Cities in A?mucAN Gov Em tm"r AmNwAL (Hinderaker ed. 1952);
WILoN, THF AMAtrUR DEMOCRAT (1962).
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formers have nothing to lose in the wards which regard organizations
of the poor as a vehicle for moving the Negroes next door.
New York, as a city without an overwhelmingly powerful regular
party machine, is especially promising territory for an alliance between
the reformers and the organized poor. When the East-Side antipoverty
project, Mobilization For Youth, was under attack for left-wing asso-
ciations and sloppy bookkeeping, the organization found support in the
New York reform clubs.83 But before the significance of the reformers'
sympathy for Mobilization could be ascertained, the old Democratic
bosses threatened to regain city hall; and many of the Manhattan re-
formers forgot MFY as they entered a good government alliance with
Mobilization's executioner, Paul Screvane. The eventual winner of the
mayoral race, John Lindsay, endorsed maximum participation of the
poor as part of his appeal for Reform Democratic support. His appoint-
ment of an advisory panel, including Cyril Tyson and Richard Boone,
to plan a regenerate War on Poverty suggests that the reformers may
yet become the patrons of militant social action in New York.84
San Francisco provides a fuller example of the possibilities for co-
operation between city reformers and organizers of the poor. Poverty
elections are a "dangerous social experiment" in a city like San Fran-
cisco where the mayor is reluctant to share control of the poverty
program and lacks a strong regular organization in the slums. When
Mayor John Shelley came under local pressure to choose a majority of
the community action board through neighborhood elections, he asked
OEO to bail him out by suggesting a plan for a reduced number of
elected representatives."5 OEO's national Community Action Director,
Theodore Berry, seemed satisfied with the mayor's truncated election
plan until the city's reformers convinced Congressman Philip Burton
to intervene. Burton persuaded Berry to deny publicly the mayor's
claim and to order San Francisco to proceed with a full-scale poverty
election." A majority of the community action board are now elected
neighborhood representatives who have allied themselves on most
issues with reformers on the board.
The reform politicians in New York, San Francisco, and other cities
will be repaying an old debt if they make an alliance with militant
social action groups. Banfield and Wilson have observed that the reform
movement, by replacing the patronage system with civil service and
83. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1964, p. 33, col. 2.
84. Other members are Michael Harrington, William Hadded and, to speak for the
beleaguered mayors, Mitchell Sviridoff of CPI.
85. San Francisco News Call-Bulletin, July 24, 1965.
86. San Francisco Examiner, July 24, 1965, p. 12, col. 1.
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eliminating "excess" city jobs, has denied the poor their traditional
mechanism for participating in city politics. 87 The ideological politics
of the poverty program, however, offers the poor an alternative political
style which could join them with the reformers in a coalition against
established city politicians. The reformer who is intolerant of the
Negro's interest in getting a job out of politics may nevertheless become
his ally when the Negro is a member of a slum organization, protesting
city hall's monopoly of the poverty program.
2. Private Funding
In most cities, the contest over participation of the poor was con-
cluded before the social action groups could establish permanent ties
to slum neighborhoods. A few entrenched organizations, however, have
obtained money from the local anti-poverty program,88 even in cities
like Chicago where the mayor seems invincible. Neighborhood organ-
izers who can find seed-money outside the political system have a good
chance of forcing the system to contribute later on.
There are several private sources of support for neighborhood social
action groups. Probably, the most important is the Citizens Crusade
Against Poverty, underwritten by the AFL-CIO's Industrial Unions
Department. The Citizens Crusade plans to train and support one
thousand community organizers and will establish a national pressure
group to protect the organizations from their natural enemies in the
city governments.8 9
Funds from private foundations are also increasingly available to
social action groups. Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation has
subsisted almost entirely on contributions from other foundations and
church groups; Mobilization For Youth has been supported at various
times by the Ford, Taconic and J.M. Kaplan Foundations.9
3. Functional Organizations
The neighborhood organizers' two most serious handicaps have been
unremitting opposition from established city politicians and the ten-
87. BAN MsIL & WILSON, op. cit. supra note 82 at 332.
88. The Chicago community action board allocated The Woodlavn Organization
$60,000 for a child-care center last spring. Interview with Nicholas von Hoffman and Lois
Wille of the Chicago Daily News, in Chicago, June 10, 1965.
89. Telephone interview with Peter Goldmark, OEO official, in Washington, D.C.,
Feb. 22, 1966.
90. Among the foundations with an interest in social action are: the Ittleson Family
Foundation, 654 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y.; J.M. Kaplan Fund, 55 5th Ave., New
York, N.Y.; Field Foundation, 250 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.; New World Foundation,
475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y.; Stern Family Fund, 21 E. 40th St., New York. N.Y.
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dency of members in protest organizations to lose interest when the
group's achievements fall short of their exaggerated expectations. These
problems, unavoidable in any attempt to fill the political vacuum of
the slums, could be mitigated by organizing neighborhoods around the
performance of social and economic functions.91
Although the common interests of the members have been sufficient
to sustain middle class pressure groups, organizations of the poor have
needed powerful structural influences to hold the groups together. The
environment of industrial factories, for example, was essential to the
stability of industrial labor unions when they were being organized in
the 1930's. Members met each other regularly and in fixed relationships;
management provided a common focus for their discontent. 2 Neigh-
borhood organizers, in contrast, must rely on agitation to unite the
atomized, contemporary slum. But exacerbated discontents are an
inferior substitute for the structural influences of the factory.93 Shared
emotions-no matter how high their pitch-do not create regular inter-
action, a convenient procedure for collecting dues, or a weapon as
effective as the industrial strike. There is an additional danger that
before the organization has significantly changed the politics of the
slums, it will become the instrument of a leadership clique and lose its
hold on the membership. In a protest organization, whose institution-
alized togetherness occurs only at mass rallies and on the picket lines,
91. OEO currently supports at least two functional groups which may become Important
slum organizations if they can maintain their independence. The Blazer Council for Youth
in Newark-with grass roots origins and grass roots management-trains two hundred
welfare recipients in automobile repairs, upholstery, floor polishing and scraping. In Phil-
adelphia, the Opportunities Industrial Center, Inc., inspired by a boycott of local businesses,
conducts a similar training program. The Philadelphia group, however, seems to have left
its protest past behind it and neither of the organizations has yet gone into business for
itself.
92. LIPs-r, TRow & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOcRACY (1956). Harrington, The Mystical
Militants, The New Republic, Feb. 19, 1966, p. 21.
93. Cloward and Piven ask:
How is the contemporary organizer to address the poor, dispersed as they are in urban
slums and generally lacking in patterns of regular interaction commensurate with
their common problems and interests? And once a group is drawn together, how
is it to be sustained? How are continuing investments in organizing to be assured and
supported? Without regular and structured interaction, a sense of common group
problems and common group interests seem [sic] unlikely to develop, especially
among a mobile and culturally heterogeneous poor; and even when a shared Ideology
does sometimes arise, it is not likely to produce widespread adherence and regular par-
ticipation.
Cloward & Piven, Politics, Professionalism and Poverty 16-17, Nov. 1965 (unpublished
paper for Columbia University School of Social Work conference on "The Role of Gov-
ernment in Promoting Social Change').
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the officers lack even the shop steward's regular contact with the
members.
Reliance on agitation may ultimately reinforce the apathy the or-
ganizer sets out to dispel. The marginal concessions extracted from city
officials cannot sustain the exaggerated aspirations and expectations
which the organizer must stir up to overcome the initial mood of hope-
lessness in the community. The poor are still the poor after the rats are
driven from the neighborhood school. In this way the energies of social
action are used up, and the militant group, that offers no long-term
functional programs, reinforces the apathy it had intended to over-
come. 14
Successful organizers, however, have not always had the environment
of the factory at their disposal. The farmers who established enduring
agricultural associations in the late nineteenth century were less like
union labor than like the atomized, contemporary slum residents, who
suffer from harsh credit practices and consumer disadvantages. After
the failure of populism, with its demagogic style of politics, farm asso-
ciations created their own "structured context" by organizing around
the performance of economic functions. The Farmers' Educational and
Co-operative Union, for example, emphasized cooperative buying and
selling, and early in its career founded the successful Farmers' Union
Grain Terminal Association.9 Gradually, as cooperative marketing or
storage facilities were established and provided the farm organizations
with stable, interactive structures, it was quite natural for them to
begin playing politics.90 Economic and political activity served the
same goal. Marketing cooperatives were one way of maintaining high
farm revenues; price supports were another.
Small manufacturing cooperatives and social service organizations
could serve the same function in the slums that cooperative grain
elevators performed on the Great Plains. 7 They could provide the
94. The outcome is summarized in the formula:
Frustration = Aspiration/Achievement
Initial militancy increases the expectations and aspirations of the participants. But the
lack of substantial reward widens the gap between expectation and achievement.
95. TRumAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PRocEss 89 (1962).
96. The American Farm Bureau Federation, though supported by a better class of
farmer than the Farmers' Union, is another prototype for urban poor peoples organiza-
tions. Its special relationship with the Agriculture Department is one of the few precedents
for the patronage of the organized poor by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Like the
Farmers' Union, the Federation's origins were functional. Before it led the farm bloc into
the 67th Congress, the Federation established a constituency in the corn belt by helping
the county agents to introduce advanced agricultural methods.
97. One likely group of cooperatives would be in those retail fields, such as appliances,
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interaction for which welfare theorists currently search the slums in
vain. An economic or social focus would also divert organizations of the
poor from the apocalyptic style that keeps aspirations and expectations
soaring above achievement. So long as neighborhood organizations are
not going to bring the Revolution to the slum, they are likely to benefit
from a style of operations commensurate with marginal, but concrete,
achievements.98
Functional organizations would provide the poor with an excellent
base for entering city politics. In the organizing stage, when they are
most vulnerable, they present an innocuous front which spares them
the relentless antagonism of the mayor. Although functional organiza-
tions might decide to pick political fights, unlike protest groups they
would not need to be constantly embroiled with city hall in order to
stay alive. They could choose the most opportune situations for using
protest techniques and would stand a better chance of winning these
fights.99 In addition, a community maintenance service, leading the
battle against slum lords, or a credit union, taking on local business-
men, could increase the neighborhood's material stake in the success of
the protest action.
Slum organizers have been understandably suspicious of diverting
the neighborhood's energies into innocuous community improvement
projects, whose real purpose was to take the heat off city hall. The
organizers are aware that social work functionaries have sometimes
used self-help groups to co-opt potential lower class leadership. 1°0 Self-
whose high mark ups are a notorious drain on slum economies. See CAPLOViTZ, Tis POOR
PAY MoRE (1963). An exterminating or housing repair service could increase employment
in the area and become the focus of a code enforcement program. Food co-ops, of course,
already exist in many slum neighborhoods.
98. A functional organization of the poor would demand a special combination of
talents in its leaders. They would need enough of the character of the conventional slum
organizer to excite the neighborhood about the cooperative. But even allowing for some
government assistance, the co-op would eventually have to pay its way. The charismatic
leader must be something of a bookkeeper behind the scenes. Many organizers appreciate
the advantages of economic issues for focusing the resentments of a slum area. Few of
them, however, relish the prospect of operating a grocery store or maintenance service. See
Village Voice, Aug. 5, 1965, p. 10, col. 1.
99. In a campaign against the provision of regular-priced, low.quality food to slum
areas, for example, a food co-op would have several advantages over an ordinary pro.
test organization. Several of its employees would be familiar with food distribution
practices in the city and would know where the group was most likely to extract con-
cessions. The co-op would have a built-in mechanism for inspecting food entering the
area and could continue its surveillance easily after the popular campaign had ended.
Finally the co-op, as the purveyor of worthwhile services to the area, could survive the
disappointment of the members if the campaign was not immediately successful.
100. Cf. Gans, Social and Physical Planning for the Elimination of Urban Poverty, 1963
WAS. U.L.Q. 2, 5.
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help's own enthusiasts have contributed to its eclipse by discoursing on
community action as if the subject had nothing to do with class conflict
and composing tributes to "bootstrapping" which suggest an army of
high-minded poor, marching from their old-law tenements to pick the
garbage from the streets.
This parody of social action has prepared the organizers for Alinsky's
maxim that the only way to organize the poor in their self-interest is to
pick at their wounds. But the politics of a functional organization are
not defined by its decision to organize around economic or social
services. An established functional group can be as tough and antago-
nistic as its members desire. And when the organization enters politics,
its cohesion gives it some chance of success.
